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ABSTRACT 
Memory based vulnerabilities have plagued the computer industry since the 
release of the Morris worm twenty years ago.  In addition to buffer overflow 
attacks like the Morris worm, format strings, ret-libC, and heap double free() 
viruses have been able to take advantage of pervasive programming errors.  A 
recent example is the unspecified buffer overflow vulnerability present in Mozilla 
Firefox 3.0.  From the past one can learn that these coding mistakes are not 
waning.  A solution is needed that can close off these security shortcomings 
while still being of minimal impact to the user.  Antivirus software makers 
continuously overestimate the lengths that the everyday user is willing to go to in 
order to protect his or her system.  The ideal protection scheme will be of little or 
no inconvenience to the user.  A technique that fits this niche is one that is built 
into the hardware.  Typical users will never know of the added protection they're 
receiving because they are getting it by default.  Unlike the NX bit technology in 
modern x86 machines, the correct solution should be mandatory and 
uncircumventable by user programs.  The idea of marking memory as non-
executable is maintained but in this case the granularity is refined to the byte 
level.  The standard memory model is extended by one bit per byte to indicate 
whether the data stored there is trusted or not.  While this design is not unique in 
the architecture field, the issues that arise from multiple processing units in a 
single system causes complications.  Therefore, the purpose of this work is to 
investigate hardware based mandatory access control mechanisms that work in 
the multicore paradigm.  As a proof of concept, a buffer overflow style attack has 
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been crafted that results in an escalation of privileges for a nonroot user.  While 
effective against a standard processor, a CPU modified to include byte level 
tainting successfully repels the attack with minimal performance overhead.
  viii 
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1. Introduction 
The world of computer security is an ongoing cat and mouse game between 
antivirus companies and hackers.  In this game, the black hats seem to have the 
upper hand as most patches for malicious software are not available until after 
the attack is unleashed on an unfortunate group of computers.  While updates 
are necessary to fix existing problems in already released software, a more 
proactive approach to computer security could greatly benefit the everyday user.  
This could come in the form of a variety of solutions.  One of the more promising 
and interesting areas is mandatory access controls.  Mandatory access controls 
(MACs) in computer systems are memory access protocols that the user cannot 
circumvent even if he or she wanted.  This can be contrasted with discretionary 
controls like the standard read, write, and execute properties that are common to 
Windows and Linux platforms.  What makes correctly used MACs powerful is the 
fact that a user, whether due to ignorance or ill intent, cannot cause harm to the 
system.  This ability to repel an attack from an insider has led the National 
Security Agency to create and adopt a MAC based operating system known as 
SELinux [35].  Hardware based MACs can first be seen in an elaborate new 
computer architecture introduced in 1960 [24].  Failing to reach the mainstream, 
they have been the subject of academic research ever since.  These systems 
have the ability to enforce security protocols at the lowest level and with little to 
no change to existing software which makes the solution both powerful and far-
reaching.  While meeting security goals is important, a successful computer 
security solution must also conform to the paradigm of the future. 
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The difficulty in continuously increasing clock speed has caused CPU designers 
to resort to increasing the number of cores on a chip in an effort to maintain 
exponential growth in computing power.  The popularity of this trend can be seen 
in a quote from Intel President Paul Otellni, “We are dedicating all our future 
product development to multicore designs” [16].  The result of this has been a 
programming and security nightmare.  The challenge of merely maintaining 
consistency across memory has proved to be difficult.  A security solution that 
doesn’t fit with a multicore design is inherently doomed.  Therefore, it is the 
purpose of this work to adapt hardware based mandatory access controls to fit 
multicore architectures. 
1.1. Motivation 
1.1.1. Buffer Overflow Attack Prevalence 
Of all the different ways for a hacker to gain access to privileged information or to 
disrupt desired functionality, buffer errors are probably the easiest and most 
successful.  Buffer overflows are just one form of memory based vulnerability, 
however, according to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) they still 
account for around 12% of all computer vulnerabilities [9] .  The number of 
vulnerabilities classified as “buffer errors” by the NVD is given in Figure 1.1.  It is 
important to note in Figure 1.1 that data has only been collected up to the 
midpoint of 2008.  Extrapolating the year’s trend indicates that in 2008 there will 
be over 600 buffer error vulnerabilities.  The percentage of all vulnerabilities 
which fall into that same category is given in Figure 1.2.   
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Figure 1.1: Number of vulnerabilities classified as buffer errors over time [9] 
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Figure 1.2: Percentage of vulnerabilities classified as buffer errors over time [9] 
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Even more disturbing is the fact that despite the antiquity of this problem, the 
percentage of all vulnerabilities that are of this type has been growing over the 
past couple of years.  In the face of two decades of research and numerous 
solutions, the problem still persists.  This thesis proposes a solution to the buffer 
overflow problem along with other, less prevalent, memory based vulnerabilities 
such as format strings and heap-based attacks.  
1.1.2. End User Involvement 
The problem is not the lack of solutions, but of a pervasive one that can be 
enabled and adapted easily by large populations and that actually solves the 
underlying problem.  It can be seen from past work that the solutions with the 
greatest chance of adoption, and therefore success, are those that require a 
minimal amount of effort and skill from the user.  Many types of existing solutions 
already require too much from their users.  People may not be willing to install 
update software because they don’t like having to restart their computer 
everyday due to new updates.  Most users won’t pay a monthly subscription fee 
to get the latest antivirus updates.  Observations like this can be seen in a more 
quantitative way in Figure 1.3 [37].  Despite a plethora of new computer 
architectures, the leader continues to be x86 due, in part, to its large installed 
base of software.  The millions of lines of legacy code still in use means that 
requiring developers to substantially change their applications or libraries often 
leads to difficult new architectures being labeled unusable.   
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Figure 1.3: Disparity Between Installed User Security Software and Perceived 
[37] 
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Therefore, the desired solution should be completely backwards compatible with 
existing x86 code and require no recompilation or relinking.  Often, this type of 
solution is one that is hardware based.   
1.2. Background 
The first great computer infection, the Morris Worm of 1988, made use of a buffer 
overflow exploit in the fingerd application as one of its methods of propagation 
[30].  Given the vastness and damage of the worm, one would think that in a 
short amount of time a solution would be developed that would inoculate the 
world’s computers from such a sickness.  However, in 2001, thirteen years after 
the Morris Worm, the Code-Red and CodeRedII worms would use another buffer 
overrun that would cost $2.6 billion [26].  This is a testimony to the 
ineffectiveness of the proposed protection schemes during that thirteen year 
period and the overall prevalence of this attack scheme.  Unlike standard file 
permissions, a proper solution should not be discretionary upon the user's desire, 
but should have at least some mechanisms that are mandatory and 
uncontrollable even at the privileged operating system level.  This level of 
security would be enforced by the processor itself, as a fundamental property of 
the ISA. 
1.2.1. Stack Smashing Attack 
One looking for a walkthrough about how to create a buffer overflow attack need 
look no further than the archives of the hacker magazine Phrack [2].   
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In 1998, it published a widely cited article giving a walkthrough on how to 
construct a buffer overflow attack that is readable at the introductory 
programming level.  To understand such an attack, first one must consider what 
a standard stack frame looks like in memory.  This is given in Figure 1.4.  A 
typical stack smashing attack will attempt to find an unsafe function call like 
strcpy().  strcpy() copies the string pointed to by source into the array pointed to 
by destination up to and including the terminating null character.  The function 
prototype for strcpy() is given in Figure 1.5.  The security issue arises from the 
fact that strcpy() copies data into destination until the null terminating character is 
found in source despite the length of either arrays.  Good programming practice 
dictates that code should be written to make sure that no more characters are 
copied into destination then it can hold.  Unfortunately, good programming 
practices are not always observed.  When a source array is not properly bounds 
checked, it allows an attack to overflow the destination buffer.  Most often, this 
buffer is overflowed up to the point of overwriting the return address stored on 
the stack.  The attacker changes the return address to point back into the buffer 
thereby redirecting execution into the attacker supplied string.  The resulting 
stack frame is shown side by side with a normal one in Figure 1.6.  Normally the 
attacker stores shell code to exec a shell in the buffer and by this means has his 
own prompt to do whatever he/she wishes. 
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Figure 1.4: Standard Stack Frame 
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char * strcpy ( char * destination, const char * 
source )
{
...
}
 
Figure 1.5: Function prototype for strcpy() 
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Figure 1.6: Normal and Overflowed Stack Frames 
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1.3. Summary 
In this chapter, the need for a protection scheme was motivated by the 
substantial and increasing number of buffer overflow attacks.  Statistics show 
that most users are not aware of the security features on their computers.  
Regardless if this is because of a lack of knowledge or lack of effort, a successful 
solution to memory based vulnerabilities will be one that requires little from the 
everyday user.  A high level look into stack frames and stack buffer overflows 
was also offered.  In an effort to thwart stack buffer overflows, many solutions 
have been attempted over the years, some of which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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2. Related work 
Since the inception of the modern computer as a device to calculate artillery 
trajectories, security has been a concern.  With the dawn of the Internet it has 
taken on a whole new meaning and importance.  In this chapter some historical 
attempts to provide security are discussed followed by modern methods that 
attempt to achieve a robust system. 
2.1. A Brief History of Secure Architectures 
Dating back to 1959, there has been an effort to create more secure processors 
by enforcing safety precautions at the hardware level.  Capability-based 
architectures refer to computer systems that access data using an address that 
refers to both the memory object itself and a set of access rights that govern how 
that data can be used.  For an excellent reference of such architectures see [23]. 
2.1.1. Burroughs 
First shown in the early 1960s, the Burroughs family of processors incorporated 
some very sophisticated features for their time [24].  Originally, the B5000 used a 
1 bit tag as part of its 32 bit word.  The B6000 expanded it to 3 bits and moved it 
outside the word.  It differentiates data from code and control words and is even 
used to indicate type (such as single and double precision floating point).  The 
hardware enforced security mechanism makes it impossible to execute data as 
code or to interpret code as data. 
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2.1.2. System/38 
Released in 1980, the IBM System/38 sought to be a totally object-oriented 
architecture [18].  The System/38 featured 40 bit words consisting of 32 data bits, 
7 bit ECC, and a 1 bit tag.  The tag bit is set whenever the data bits contain a 
pointer while all other words in memory have their tag bits cleared.  These tag 
bits cannot be accessed by the instruction interface and cannot be set by the 
user.  Instead, they are manipulated by instructions that use microcode to build 
the pointers and maintain the integrity of the tag bits.  User modification of the 
pointer results in its tag bits being cleared thus making it invalid for addressing 
purposes.  
2.1.3. iAPX 432 
Introduced in the year after the IBM System/38, the design and layout of the 
chipset for the Intel iAPX 432 took over 100 man-years [23].  Memory references 
are done using 32 bit long access descriptors (ADs) that specify the actual 
address and access rights to an object.  A procedure can only address and 
manipulate the ADs that are within its execution environment.  The access rights 
specify whether the possessor of the AD can read from or write to the object or 
delete the AD itself.  Unfortunately, the iAPX 432 was doomed by performance 
problems and an overzealous marketing campaign. 
2.1.4. Unisys 
A novel computer architecture that is still around today is used by Unisys 
Mainframes [41].  The ISA tags each word of memory to indicate how the data 
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stored there can be used.  All data references are done through descriptors 
generated by the hardware and operating system using instructions unavailable 
to ordinary user code.  Every memory reference is checked for a valid descriptor 
and that the reference is within appropriate bounds.  Programs that are running 
are not given privilege to descriptors that hold their own code or that of another 
program.  Furthermore, code and data are kept separate eliminating any 
adjacency between buffers and areas containing executable code. 
2.1.5. NX bit 
Mandatory Access Controls were brought into the mainstream when AMD began 
to use an extra bit, the No eXecute bit (NX), to mark pages of memory as non-
executable [43].  Intel later followed with what it called the Execute Disable bit 
[13].  The capability of the processor to take advantage of this sort of functionality 
can be queried by the operating system that is running.  When activated by 
setting the bit IA32_EFER.NXE, memory pages can be marked as not being 
executable. This is done by adjusting bit 63 in the corresponding page table entry 
for that page of memory.  If the protection is running and an instruction fetch to a 
linear address translates to a physical address in a memory page that has the 
execute disable bit set, a page fault exception will be generated.  This sort of 
protection is very close to what is desired in protecting memory from memory 
based vulnerabilities: there is no effort required of the user other than having a 
processor with the ability, it incurs very little memory or performance overhead, 
and it is backwards compatible with existing code.   
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To allow for backwards compatibility, Intel decided to give the host OS the ability 
to turn non-executable pages on or off.  Windows XP Service Pack 2 and 
Windows 2003 Service Pack 1 contain patches to take advantage of this 
hardware feature by using what Microsoft calls Data Execution Prevention (DEP) 
[1].  Shortly after its debut, exploits began to be posted that easily sidestepped 
the mechanism [28].  In order to bypass DEP, a ret-libC style attack can be used 
to jump to a section of system code marked as executable that can then further 
be exploited to disable DEP and return into shell code stored in the original 
buffer.  If there was no way that a process could disable NX support at runtime, 
this exploit would not work.   
2.2. Recent Solutions 
In an attempt to close off the buffer overflow attack vector, many solutions have 
come about.  As the goal of this work is to place a minimal amount of burden on 
the user, previous attempts can best be organized along a continuum with the 
least user involvement at one end and the most at the other.  Within that 
continuum, most solutions fall into a particular category depending upon their 
level of abstraction: language, compiler, library, application, operating system, or 
hardware.  These form a gradient as shown in Figure 2.1. 
2.2.1. Safe Languages 
Buffer overflows arise from the lack of type safety and bounds checking in C.   
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Figure 2.1: Amount of user involvement required for various type solutions. 
Safe Languages: Java, 
Cyclone 
Compiler Based: CRED, 
StackGuard, Dynamic 
Access Control 
Safe Libraries: 
Libsafe 
Operating System 
additions: PaX. 
Hardware-Based: Secure 
Bit2, Raksha, Minos, 
DIFT 
Decreasing 
Amount of 
Required User 
Interaction 
Applications: Program 
Shepherding, LIFT, 
Pointer Encryption, 
Shadow Threads 
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Work has been done in the past to create a programming language that has built 
in bounds checking or is otherwise immune to buffer attacks.  Despite whatever 
security features these languages may have, they normally require code to be 
ported from C to the new safe language.  Porting this amount of legacy code, 
some of which has been lost, to an entirely new language would be a massive 
undertaking.  Another problem with both language and compiler techniques is the 
availability of source code.  While open source movements are gaining 
popularity, there is still a great amount of proprietary software in use.  For 
companies unwilling to release the source code, the following techniques would 
not work. 
2.2.1.1. Java 
The security and portability features of Java make it very desirable to replace C 
as the language of choice.  There seems to be a growing trend of applications 
being written in Java versus other languages [39].  The Java Virtual Machine 
(JVM) and corresponding bytecode is what makes Java so portable and safe [8].  
Interestingly enough, the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) is written in C, and is 
vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks itself [12].  Unfortunately, Java as a 
vulnerability solution suffers from the previously stated issues related to legacy 
code porting.   
2.2.1.2. Cyclone 
Cyclone follows nearly all of C’s lexical conventions and grammar.  It also offers 
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the same fundamental and composite data types.  Where they differ is on the 
issue of security [19].  A cyclone compiler performs a static analysis on the 
program and inserts runtime checks into the compiled code at places where 
safety is in danger.  The compiler can also choose to reject a program based on 
a static analysis of its code that deems it unsafe.  As compared to the same 
program written in C, Cyclone’s slowdown varies from 1X to 3X and as much as 
6X in pathological cases that feature a great amount of pointer arithmetic.  The 
test suite consisted of common web utilities such as http_get and http_post, 
and computationally intensive benchmarks like cfrac, maxtmult, and tile 
[19].  Subsequently, Cyclone found array bounds violations in three benchmarks, 
one of which dates back to the mid 1980s. 
2.2.2. Compiler Based Solutions 
While compiler based solutions share the requirement of source code availability, 
they also have the unique disadvantage of demanding users to recompile their 
programs.  Many users are unaware of how to do this and many of those who are 
may choose not to deal with the hassle of recompiling their programs. 
2.2.2.1. StackGuard 
StackGuard, part of the Immunix Linux Distribution, is probably one of the most 
well known stack smashing protection schemes available [6]. It is a modified 
version of the gcc compiler that automatically inserts “canaries” into the stack 
before a function is called [7]. After the function completes, and before it returns 
to the return address on the stack, the canary value is checked with a stored 
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version.  If the values do not match, then it means that the canary has been 
illegally overwritten, and the stack corrupted.  A canary may be a simple XOR 
with a secret key or an even simpler scheme.  A canary that is comprised solely 
of null values is adequate to stop buffer overflow attacks.  When strcpy() is 
called, it will return upon reaching the null value instead of continuing to overwrite 
out of bounds data on the stack.   
2.2.2.2. CRED 
CRED (C Range Error Detection) is an extension to the GNU compiler that was 
developed at Stanford University [33].  It relies on replacing every out-of-bounds 
pointer value with the address of a special OOB (out-of-bounds) object created 
for that value.  At the current state of development, CRED would break when 
using an out of bounds pointer in an external library.  It was effective against 20 
different buffer overflow attacks and also ran 20 open-source programs 
consisting of 1.2 million lines of code [33].  The average performance 
degradation was 2X but up to 20X for some applications.  Incorporating this idea 
into the next distribution of an operating system would allow CRED to reach a 
large user base without forcing users to recompile existing applications.   
2.2.2.3. Dynamic Access Control 
Dynamic Access Control monitors program data that might be indicative of an 
attack, even those attacks that do not alter control flow [44].  The dangers of 
these types of attacks are demonstrated in [5].  Dynamic Access Control requires 
support at both the hardware and micro-architecture level.  The compiler 
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identifies program regions in which the data should not be modified as per 
program semantics.  If there is an attempt to modify this data at runtime, the 
hardware detects the attack. 
2.2.3. Safe Libraries 
Libsafe is an example of a secure library [15]. It intercepts certain unsafe calls 
such as strcpy() or fgets() and calculates the maximum allowed size of the buffer 
based on the stack frame address, and then calls the safer bounded variant such 
as strncpy(). Although this solution has proven to be effective against some stack 
overflows, it still suffers some flaws. One specific problem is that it does not 
prevent the overflow itself, in-band data within the stack frame can still be 
overwritten.  As previously mentioned, a system in which just the control flow 
data is protected can still be vulnerable to attack. Like other library-based 
approaches, it is only applicable when the application is dynamically linked. It will 
not be effective for statically linked software or for user defined functions.  
2.2.4. Monitoring Applications 
2.2.4.1. Program Shepherding 
Program Shepherding is a system built on top of Runtime Introspection and 
Optimization (RIO), a dynamic optimizer application, and seeks to stop malicious 
code executions by using the concepts of restricted code origins, restricted 
control transfers, and uncircumventable sandboxing [20] . When an application is 
run under this paradigm, the loader must first determine if the block of 
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instructions is trusted in accordance with a security policy and the origins of the 
code, e.g. executable file from the disk or dynamically generated code, and tags 
them as executable. This first step is known as restricted code origins. Restricted 
control transfers refers to the restriction of jumps and branches from one block of 
memory to another only if it is allowed in the security policy, e.g. if the target of 
the branch is not tagged as executable, then control transfer should be restricted. 
Finally, uncircumventable sandboxing is used to ensure that all implemented 
security checks must be done at all times.   
2.2.4.2. LIFT 
Low-Overhead Information Flow Tracking is a tainting architecture that is built on 
top of the dynamic binary translator StarDBT [3].  A typical tainting scheme would 
identify data from untrusted channels (e.g. network, keyboard, USB) and taint, or 
tag, that data as being not executable.  If this data is copied to a new location or 
used as an operand in another instruction, the destination operand would also be 
marked as untrusted.  Only untainted memory locations would be used as return 
address, jump destinations or function pointers.  For LIFT, a one bit tag is 
associated with each byte of data in memory or in registers.  These tags are 
stored in a special memory region that generates a protection fault when a 
program attempts to access them.  Tags for registers are stored in a spare CPU 
register.  If the architecture has no spare registers, another special memory 
region is allocated to store the data.  The extra functionality of propagating taint 
bits is accomplished by instrumenting the binary with additional instructions that 
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keep track of the current taint values.  While the overhead is much less than that 
of a similar, previous tool, LIFT incurs an average performance slowdown of 3.6X 
for SPEC-INT [32]. 
2.2.4.3. Pointer Encryption 
A novel protection scheme involves encrypting return addresses and function 
pointers when they are stored then decrypting them when they are loaded [40].  
Since every return address goes through a decryption before it is loaded into 
program counter, a typical stack smashing attack would result in execution 
jumping to a random location in memory.  This is because the address of the 
shell code (presumably stored within the overflowed buffer) would be decrypted 
and result in an unknown value, but most likely not where the attack desired.  In 
the original paper, a variety of methods are offered to minimize the encryption 
overhead and ensure cryptographic security. 
2.2.4.4. Shadow Threads 
A recent innovation takes advantage of evolving multicore architectures by 
spawning a “shadow thread” to ensure security of the executing main thread [4].  
Ideally, each thread would be running on a separate core thereby making use of 
idle cores.  First the binary is modified to allocate “shadow memory” which will be 
used to indicate the level of trust associated with a piece of data.  As the main 
thread executes regular program instructions, the shadow thread stays a few 
instructions behind and performs regular tainting arithmetic.  The two threads use 
a synchronizer which relays control flow information from the main thread to the 
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shadow thread.  Before branches are taken, the main thread waits for the 
shadow thread to catch up and then evaluates whether the branch target is safe 
or not.  The shadow thread serves as a way to get the extra tainting functionality 
without adding additional code to the program or introducing new memory 
architectures.  Runtime performance varied from 1.5X – 5.5X slowdown on a 
suite of custom applications and one program from SPEC-INT [4]. 
2.2.5. Operating System Patches 
PaX is a Linux kernel patch written by The PaX Team whose principal author 
chooses to remain anonymous.  PaX’s main avenues of defense are to mark 
data as non-executable and take advantage of address space layout 
randomization (ASLR) [34].  By default, PaX marks the following areas as non-
executable: memory that holds the stack, heap, anonymous memory mappings, 
and any section not specifically marked as executable in an ELF file.  This 
prevents the standard stack-smashing attack since shell code stored in the buffer 
on the stack will be marked as non-executable.  PaX randomizes the location of 
the stack, heap, loaded libraries, and executable binaries thereby greatly 
reducing the likelihood of success for attacks that rely on hard coded addresses, 
such as a standard ret-libC attack.  This protection, when combined with a 
hardware protection scheme such as the NX bit provides for powerful protection.   
It should also be noted that a successful attack on PaX has been published on 
Phrack [27].  It directly calls the dynamic linker’s symbol resolution procedure to 
get around the ASLR aspect of Pax and then uses a traditional ret-libC exploit. 
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2.2.6. Hardware Based Solutions 
Another class of buffer overflow prevention techniques are those that make 
modifications to the actual hardware of a CPU.  By doing so, users would benefit 
from these additional features upon buying a new system and most likely would 
not even know they were there.  Users wouldn’t have to recompile the programs 
they have, download new ones, or manually patch their OS.  Most hardware 
based solutions use the notion of “tainting” memory locations.  These taint bits 
are either all stored together in one continuous piece of memory or are tacked on 
to the end of every memory location.  The latter is the more common case and 
has the advantage of being able to move and operate on taint bits with each 
instruction.  In this particular scenario, all registers, caches, cache lines, and 
main memory would have to be widened by some amount.  The operating 
system is expected to identify unsafe channels of input and mark the 
corresponding data as it streams into the computer.  This change to the OS can 
be expected with the new hardware that the user buys. 
2.2.6.1. Secure Bit2 
Secure Bit2 extends every memory word and register by one bit which is used to 
add semantic meaning to each word of memory [31].  This bit is moved along 
with its associated word by memory manipulating instructions.  Words in buffers 
passed between processes get their secure bit set while all others mark the 
secure bit at the destination register or memory location.  Call, return, and jump 
instructions check the secure bit and if set, generate an interrupt or fault signal.  
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Modifications are required at the kernel level to set the secure bit when passing a 
buffer across domains.  Since the address validation is done in hardware, there 
is no performance overhead.  Memory overhead is related to the total size of 
memory, for n words of memory, an additional n bits are needed. 
2.2.6.2. Raksha 
Raksha offers multiple active security policies that can all be run simultaneously 
and are also programmable [11].  In this setup, every word of memory is 
extended by 4 bits, one for each security policy running.  Each processor 
instruction carries out some operation for each of the security policies, one of 
which is solely devoted to high level attacks like SQL injection.  This is what sets 
Raksha apart from many other hardware based solutions: the ability to recognize 
this type of sophisticated attack.  In addition, software can modify the tag rules 
for each policy and configure how tags from multiple operands are combined.  
Raksha even allows a user to specify custom rules for a small number of 
individual instructions.  These modifications were made to the open source Leon 
SPARC V8 processor and synthesized to a FPGA.  The additional hardware 
caused a 7% increase in size over an unmodified Leon.  Performance slowdown 
on SPEC ranged from 1X – 2.98X [11]. 
2.2.6.3. Minos 
While Raksha is one of the newer tainting architectures, Minos is one of the older 
ones Error! Reference source not found..  Like Secure Bit, Minos extends 
each 32 bit word with a single integrity bit.  The security policy can be 
  27 
summarized as follows: any subject may modify any object if the object’s integrity 
is not greater than that of the subject, but any subject that reads an object has its 
integrity lowered to the minimum of the object’s integrity and its own.  These 
operations are carried out in parallel with the normal functionality of the 
instruction.  Minos is implemented and tested on the Pentium emulator known as 
Bochs.  When an attempt is made to transfer control flow to low integrity data, the 
processor traps to the kernel for error recovery.  A similar architecture is offered 
by Chen, et. al. in [42]. 
2.2.6.4. DIFT 
Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) also features modifications to the 
standard memory model by storing an extra bit for each byte of memory [36].  
The memory overhead was greatly reduced by using multi-granularity tags.  Each 
page of memory contains two extra bits which are used to indicate if all the taint 
bits on that page are the same and if they are all marked as trusted or not.  If 
needed, the processor generates an exception to allocate more memory for 
individual bytes on a page, but by default marks all taint bits the same.  This 
method reduced total memory overhead from 12.5% to 0.21% due to common 
occurrence of entire pages of memory having the same tag.  Despite being 
publicized in 2004, DIFT remains the only tainting scheme that makes use of 
multi granularity tags.  Two different policies are offered depending on the 
amount of performance one is willing to sacrifice in exchange for security.  This 
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approach also uses binary annotation to recognize when data is properly bounds 
checked.  When this occurs, the destination buffer can be marked as trusted. 
2.3. Summary 
This chapter explores some of the past attempts to eliminate memory based 
vulnerabilities dating back to 1959.  Recent efforts up to 2007 have also been 
examined.  Ranging from requiring developers to code in an entirely different 
language to coming built into new computer designs, they provide differing levels 
of security based on the amount of performance sacrificed or user involvement 
necessary.  By examining the advantages and disadvantages of past solutions, a  
novel computer architecture that protects against buffer overflows is offered. 
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3. Approach 
After thoroughly studying past and present protection schemes as well as 
modern attacks, the goal of this thesis is to provide a solution that fulfills the 
following requirements: 
 Provides protection from known memory based vulnerabilities such as 
buffer overflows 
 Works with existing legacy code 
 Does not require recompilation 
 Is compatible with emerging trends in processor architectures (multicore) 
 Gives the maximum amount of security while sacrificing the least amount 
of performance 
 Requires the least amount of user intervention 
 Is mandatory as opposed to discretionary 
3.1. Design Details 
Working from these goals towards a specific solution leads one to believe that 
the correct approach is one that is hardware based.  By employing a hardware 
based protection scheme, the user gains a security advantage without having to 
install new software or recompile their existing software.  Whenever the user 
buys their new system, the protections are built in.   
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3.1.1. Memory extension 
3.1.1.1. Byte or Word? 
In the past, some tainting architectures have chosen to add one bit per byte [11] 
[36] [32] [42] [21] while others have chose to taint per 32 bit word [31] [9].  This 
approach will follow the former, more popular scheme.  That is, every 
addressable memory location remains 8 bits wide but also has a one bit tag at 
the end.  So each 4 byte word will have 32 bits of data along with 4 one bit tags 
interspersed throughout its bytes.  Many processors, particularly x86, allow byte 
granularity memory access.  Even though compilers normally align memory 
accesses to words or double words, there are still many cases in C that make 
word level tainting impractical.  Aggregate types such as unions are one 
particular problem because they are often accessed in different ways, even 
without modifying data.  On the other hand, a difficulty that arises from tainting at 
the byte level comes when data is accessed in large chunks that contain 
separate taint values.  For example, imagine a union that can be accessed as 4 
chars or 1 integer.  If the chars were stored separately, they could each have a 
different taint value.  Which does the CPU use in computing the taint value for 
the destination?  In this work, the taint values are ORed together so that the 
result is the least trusted of all the bytes. 
3.1.1.2. Architecture 
The taint bit extension has to be made to every single memory location including 
registers, caches, and main memory.  An abstract view of this CPU is shown in 
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Figure 3.1.  The additional hardware is shown by a darker shade.  This particular 
CPU is a four core system that is composed of 2 dual core packages.  The 
diagram is based on the Intel Core 2 Quad architecture codenamed Kentsfield 
with model numbers in the Q6xx0 range [17].  Each core has its own L1 
instruction and data cache and shares a unified L2 cache with the other core on 
the package.  The taint unit of the L1 instruction cache must be wired to the ALU 
for verification in the case of a branching instruction.  The tainting ALU (TALU) 
enforces the taint propagation rules for combining tainted and untainted data.  
The registers also have been extended to accommodate the taint bits and 
forward their status on to the TALU as well.  While at first the wiring complexity 
may seem staggering, one should keep in mind that Figure 3.1 is just an abstract 
view of what the processor would look like.  In reality, taint bits wouldn’t be kept 
in a separate space on the same level of memory.  Instead, they would be kept 
right beside the data as if each memory location were 9 bits wide.  Adding one 
extra wire for each byte of data should not drastically complicate the wiring of a 
modern CPU.  An extensive study of the area required to implement tagging bits 
is made in [9] and is estimated to be less than 0.5% for per-word tagging.  Even 
with per byte tagging, the cost will be minimal compared to the size of modern 
x86 processors. 
3.1.1.3. Overhead 
Memory overhead for byte level tainting is 12.5%.  A sample stack with taint 
extensions can be seen in Figure 3.2.   
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Figure 3.1: A 4 Core Processor with Tainting Hardware 
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Figure 3.2: Memory layout of proposed architecture. 
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This is a small price to pay for additional security.  At the current rate that 
memory densities are growing, this price can be paid in a very short time by 
Moore’s Law. 
All memory and cache lines will also have to be extended to facilitate transporting 
the extra information along the data path.  Taint bits are passed through the 
memory hierarchy from registers to L1, L2, or main memory right alongside the 
actual data. 
3.1.2. Taint Propagation Rules 
Most importantly, a set of rules must be devised for how taint bits interact with 
each other.  From a security standpoint, most of these rules are pretty 
straightforward.  For example, the taint value for the result of an addition 
operation should be the least trusted of the two operands. For this application, a 
taint value of “1” means that the data stored at that location is not trusted.  
Conversely, a taint value of “0” means that that particular piece of memory is safe 
to branch to.   A set of taint propagation rules is listed in Table 3.1.  These rules 
are a modified set based on the rules in [11] [36] [32] [42] [21].  Note that ALU 
represents typical ALU operations such as ADD, SUB, OR.  The special case 
XOR entry in the table corresponds to a commonly used compiler technique to 
clear a register.  In doing so, the destination register will be all zeros and can be 
considered to be trusted. 
 
  35 
Table 3.1: Taint Propagation Rules. 
Instruction Meaning Rules 
ALU R1, R2, R3 R1 <- R2 + R3 T[R1] <- T[R2] OR T[R3] 
LW R1 IMM(R2) R1 <- Mem[R2+IMM] T[R1] <- T[R2] OR T[IMM] 
SW R1, IMM(R2) Mem[R2+IMM] <- R1 T[R2+IMM] <- T[R1] OR T[IMM] 
XOR R1, R2, R2 R1 <- R2 XOR R2 
(R1 <- 0)      
T[R1] <- 0 
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3.1.3. Additional ALU functionality 
Additionally, the CPU is modified to propagate taint information while performing 
normal operations.  Typical assembly commands like add or load now contain 
extra functionality.  This extra functionality comes from the ALU itself, not 
instructions that are annotated to the binary.  This allows legacy code to run 
without having to recompile or instrument the executable.  Given the scale and 
complexity of modern chips, the additional space required to carry out the taint 
propagation rules will be minimal because the operators are so simple.  Branch 
instructions like RET, CALL, or JMP must validate the taint bits before branching 
to that location. 
3.1.4. Floating Point, MMX and SSE 
Since floating point data should never be used as the target for a branch or 
return instruction, all floating point data is marked as tainted.  Memory extensions 
are not needed by the FPU or FP registers because when writing floating point 
data back to memory, it is automatically marked as untrusted. 
Multimedia / vector instructions such as MMX and SSE and all their variations 
can be considered in the same way.  No extra functionality is performed by these 
instructions because they operate on floating point data and as such are forced 
to write back to memory with low integrity. 
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3.1.5. Reaction to Attack 
When a branching instruction is found to be tainted, an attack is signaled.  Upon 
discovery, there are a variety of options that could be taken: trap to the operating 
system, terminate the process, or attempt to recover.  For the time being, 
whenever an attack is found, the application is terminated.  Repeated attack 
attempts could lead to a Denial of Service but this a better result than a hacker 
hijacking control flow. 
3.2. Bochs 
The proof of concept for this work is done using an IA-32 emulator called Bochs 
[22].  Bochs is an open source C / C++ project maintained on SourceForge.  
Within the computer architecture community, it is a commonly used tool to verify 
designs, particularly experimental ones [31] [9] [40].  By using Bochs the 
developer gets a chance to quickly see the results of changes made to the 
internals of a CPU.  Modifications can be tested by running different applications 
on their new, unique design.  Bochs uses a custom BIOS and can emulate a 
standard PC including memory, DMA, I/O devices, and an x86 CPU with MMX 
and SSE instructions.  A variety of processor cores can be emulated ranging 
from x386 to P4.   
Any machine with a C++ compiler can run Bochs provided they have the correct 
display libraries.  The ability to run on a variety of host operating systems while 
emulating a machine running a different OS makes Bochs useful for virtualization 
or running Linux programs natively on a Windows machine or vice versa.   
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Figure 3.3 shows a screenshot of Bochs using Windows XP as its host OS.  
Inside the emulator, Bochs is running Redhat 6.0.  Some other tested guest 
operating systems are FreeDOS [14], openBSD [29], and nearly every flavor of 
Windows including Vista [25]. By downloading the Bochs source code and 
making changes to it one can easily experiment with the internal design of CPU.  
A snippet of the code used to emulate the ADD EAX, Immediate instruction is 
shown in Figure 3.4.  If, for example, a printf() statement were entered in the 
function then every time that the assembly instruction was executed Bochs would 
print a statement to the terminal in Windows.  A more practical use would be to 
add some sort of extra functionality to the add instruction.  One such use would 
be propagating taints bits.  Being written in C makes Bochs much more 
accessible and easier to use than other hardware simulators. At program startup, 
extra storage area for taint bits had to be allocated.  Each and every integer ALU 
instruction had to be modified to include taint bit propagation as dictated by the 
tainting rules in Table 3.1.   
3.2.1. Implementation 
To facilitate testing of this new processor design, Bochs was modified to include 
taint bits for each memory location.  This involved slight modifications to many 
Bochs functions.  Dissecting and understanding the interactions and overall 
functionality of an open source program such as Bochs proved to be quite 
challenging.  Memory load and store instructions had to be modified to store the 
correct taint bits after doing the lookup from virtual address to physical address.   
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Figure 3.3: Redhat Linux running under Windows XP through the Bochs 
Emulator 
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void BX_CPU_C::ADD_EAXId(bxInstruction_c *i)
{
  int op1_32, sum_32;
  op2_32 = i->Id();
  op1_32 = EAX;
  sum_32 = op1_32 + op2_32;
  RAX = sum_32;
  SET_FLAGS_OSZAPC_ADD_32(op1_32, op2_32, 
sum_32);
}
 
Figure 3.4: Bochs Code Snippet for Add EAX, Imm instruction 
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The ALU had to be modified to not branch to addresses that were marked as 
insecure.  If the target of a branch instruction was untrusted, the program is 
terminated.  Before the performance and security of the overall system could be 
tested, the modified version of Bochs had to successfully boot a Linux disk 
image.  Upon doing so, actual testing to verify Boch’s ability to repel attacks 
could begin. 
3.3. Summary 
In this chapter, the idea of extending memory to include taint bits on a per byte 
basis was presented.  A logical overview of how a modified system would look 
was provided.  To go along with this depiction, some estimations were made 
concerning die size and memory overhead required to produce processors of this 
type.  A set of rules was laid down describing the interactions between taint bits 
depending on the currently executing instruction.  Bochs, the platform for the 
proof of concept of this work, was described along with a description of the 
changes made to it.  The next chapter will describe the performance of this 
modified CPU. 
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4. Results and Discussion 
To test and verify the proposed architecture, an attack was constructed then 
tested on an unmodified version of Redhat 6.0 running under Bochs.  Being able 
to show a successful attack before modifications and a repelled attack with 
protections in place is adequate to demonstrate a security advantage. 
4.1. The Attack 
A buffer overflow style attack was written using [2] as a guide.  The attack comes 
in two parts: an exploit program that constructs the malicious string and a 
program that has a vulnerable strcpy() call.   
4.1.1. Exploit Program 
The purpose of the first program is to form a malicious string that can then be 
used to overflow another program’s buffer.  The application takes a buffer size 
and an offset from its own stack pointer as parameters to create the string.  With 
these numbers, the program creates an “egg” which is a malicious string that 
consists of a NOP sled, shell code, and return addresses.  The NOP sled is 
placed at the bottom of the egg to allow for some error in the return address.  If 
the return address returns anywhere in the NOP sled then an unspecified 
number of NOPs is run until the shell code is reached.  After determining the 
correct length of the buffer to overflow, the length of the NOP sled and return 
address region are calculated based on the amount of shell code which will be 
put in the buffer.   
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A memory layout of the egg is given Figure 4.1.  This egg is stored in an 
environment variable for easier access.  The purpose of the code in the buffer is 
to open a shell by using the system() command.  When paired with a poorly 
coded vulnerable program, this combination makes for a particularly dangerous 
attack. 
4.1.2. Vulnerable Program 
The program which will be attacked is a simple rootecho program.  On a 
nonprivileged account it uses setuid() to run at root privilege.  This characteristic 
makes the program particularly enticing to exploit because the attacker can gain 
root access if the exploit is done correctly.  The intended purpose of the program 
is to echo the first command line argument given with it.  The code for this 
program can be found in Figure 4.2.   
4.1.3. A Successful Attack 
A successful attack involves a number of different things.  First, the exploit 
program must be run to create the malicious string.  Knowing the approximate 
size of the target buffer is greatly helpful in this process.  The popularity and 
prevalence of open source software makes this much easier than it may have 
been in the past.  Open source software also helps hackers to identify vulnerable 
programs.  By running grep and examining locations where unsafe function calls 
are made, an attacker can easily find a suitable target.  Second, the vulnerable 
program needs to be run using the malicious string as input.  Lastly, it helps to be 
a little lucky since stack addresses can vary from execution to execution.   
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Figure 4.1: An egg that would be used to overflow a buffer. 
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Figure 4.2: Rootecho program. 
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However, the NOP sled goes a long ways to reduce the chances of returning into 
the wrong address.  A successful attack showing an elevation to root privilege is 
shown in Figure 4.3.  A portion of the string is printed to the screen before a root 
shell is given. 
4.2. Defense 
The proposed solution effectively prevents the above attack from being 
successful.  Stopping an attack from gaining root privileges is noteworthy and 
validates the approach taken in this work.  Instead of the attacker having 
unfettered access to someone’s machine, the result of an attack is a 
segmentation fault.  As stated previously, the semantics of branching functions 
are modified to validate the taint bits associated with the destination.  When this 
location is found to be tainted, the instruction is not executed and the program 
crashes.  A screenshot of this is given in Figure 4.4.  Again, a portion of the 
attack string is printed, but this time a segmentation fault is given instead of a 
root shell. 
4.3. Discussion 
The above results demonstrate the ability to prevent a typical stack smashing 
attack.  While this particular example may seem simple, an unprotected system 
can be successfully exploited exactly this easily.  As previously mentioned, the 
goal of this work was to provide a hardware based solution that would be helpful 
to the everyday while requiring little to no effort on their part. 
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Figure 4.3: Successful attack. 
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Figure 4.4: An unsuccessful attack 
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A fully functional and updated SELinux machine would not be susceptible to the 
demonstrated attack.  At the same time, understanding and maintaining a 
SELinux computer is a challenging task in its own right.  Failing to grasp all the 
nuisances and security policies of the operating system usually results in a 
number of applications being labeled insecure and thus, unusable.  On the other 
side of the spectrum is the supposed user friendliness of Windows.  While 
Windows may be the everyday user’s operating system of choice, it is certainly 
not the most secure.  The popularity of Windows among laymen has made it the 
most popular platform for attack by hackers because of the number of people 
using it insecurely.  The lengths that one has to go to in order to keep their 
version of Windows up to date are substantial at times [38].  Because of this, 
some users may elect to disable automatic updates spurred in part by the 
frequent restarts required for an update to take effect.  Presumably, this would 
lead to one of the more exposed systems imaginable: an out of date Windows 
machine. 
4.4. Summary 
This chapter detailed the exploit and vulnerable programs that were used to test 
the modified multicore CPU.  A buffer overflow attack was used in combination 
with a program that used an unsafe call to strcpy() resulting in escalation of 
privileges for a nonroot user.  A processor that features byte level tainting was 
able to repel this same attack under an identical test environment.  A computer 
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featuring this type of processor would be immune to stack smashing attacks 
without ever requiring the user to install new software, download updates, or 
recompile existing software.  The mandatory nature of this protection scheme 
would make circumventing it particularly difficult.  All of this is accomplished while 
still being backwards compatible with legacy code. 
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5. Conclusions 
Memory based vulnerabilities have been a serious problem over the past two 
decades.  Over that time, a great deal of work has been done to overcome them.  
However, much of this work required a substantial amount of expertise and 
involvement from the user and was therefore unsuccessful.  For this reason, 
exploits as simple as buffer overflows remain dangerous despite their age.  The 
subject of this work has been to close off this attack vector while requiring the 
least amount of user intervention.  To accomplish this goal, a hardware based 
mandatory access control mechanism was implemented.  This allows for existing 
legacy code to be executed natively without recompilation.  To be practical, the 
design was made with multicore consideration, an aspect of tainting that has yet 
to be researched.  To demonstrate its ability to repel attacks, a pair of programs 
were created that result in a root shell for an unprivileged user.  These programs 
were successfully exploited on a typical system using the x86 emulator Bochs.  
When the hardware MAC was implemented, the attacks failed.  This was 
accomplished with only a 12.5% memory overhead and little to no performance 
degradation. 
5.1. Future Work 
As the system seems to show promise, there remains work to be done.  At the 
forefront of this list would be an actual VHDL implementation that could then be 
run on a FPGA.  Many FPGAs already feature hard processors and can run 
Linux.  Creating a custom data path that features this hardware MAC would be a 
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challenge worth the time and effort.  Unfortunately, this requires the VHDL code 
for an actual processor.  Since the platform of choice for this work was x86, the 
code could be difficult to come by.  If the platform were not important, there is a 
popular SPARC open source core available called Leon.  Instantiating multiple 
cores on an FPGA and then recreating these attacks would be a major step.   
In addition to the next steps in implementation, a variety of new attacks should be 
tested also.  The number of attacks that specifically target multicore architectures 
are few but growing.  Capturing one of these attacks in the wild and then testing 
it on Bochs or an FPGA would be productive work as well. 
Along the way, it is expected that the design would be continuously updated as 
well.  Having a graceful return from a detected attack would be favorable 
compared to a segmentation fault.  In the latter case, repeated attacks could 
result in a Denial of Service (DoS).  For some companies such as Amazon, a 
successful DoS attack can be very damaging.   
Another goal is to recognize properly bounds checked data and untaint it.  
Previous tainting schemes have attempted this with varying degrees of success.  
The difficulty is recognizing a set of instructions that qualifies as a bounds check.  
Moving the solution up to the compiler level would solve this problem, but require 
source code and recompilation.   
All of these areas deserve future consideration but at the time being, the solution 
serves its purpose in defending against buffer overflow style attacks. 
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#include <stdlib.h> 
 
#define DEFAULT_OFFSET                    0 
#define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE             512 
#define NOP                            0x90 
 
char shellcode[] = 
  
"\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\x
b0\x0b" 
  
"\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x
40\xcd" 
  "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; 
 
unsigned long get_sp(void) { 
   __asm__("movl %esp,%eax"); 
} 
 
void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { 
  char *buff, *ptr; 
  long *addr_ptr, addr; 
  int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE; 
  int i; 
 
  if (argc > 1) bsize  = atoi(argv[1]); 
  if (argc > 2) offset = atoi(argv[2]); 
 
  if (!(buff = malloc(bsize))) { 
    printf("Can't allocate memory.\n"); 
    exit(0); 
  } 
 
  addr = get_sp() - offset; 
  printf("Using address: 0x%x\n", addr); 
 
  ptr = buff; 
  addr_ptr = (long *) ptr; 
  for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4) 
    *(addr_ptr++) = addr; 
 
  for (i = 0; i < bsize/2; i++) 
    buff[i] = NOP; 
 
  ptr = buff + ((bsize/2) - (strlen(shellcode)/2)); 
  for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++) 
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    *(ptr++) = shellcode[i]; 
 
  buff[bsize - 1] = '\0'; 
 
  memcpy(buff,"EGG=",4); 
  putenv(buff); 
  system("/bin/bash"); 
} 
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